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Abstract
We model the optimal behaviour of a multiproduct monopolist investing both
in process and in product innovation in a dynamic setting. Product innovation re-
duces the degree of substitutability between any two varieties. First, we find that
R&D eﬀorts increase in both directions as the number of varieties grows. Second,
we characterise the relative intensity of R&D activities according to the reservation
price and the interaction between the number of varieties and the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation. Finally, we show the existence of complementarity within the
R&D portfolio, i.e., decreasing marginal production cost prompts for an analogous
reduction of product substitutability, and conversely.
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1 Introduction
Casual observation suggests that firms activate R&D portfolios including several projects
aimed at either product or process innovation.1 In the vast majority of cases, the twin
issues of process and product innovation are treated separately. A turning point in the
approach to the analysis of the optimal design of R&D activities along several dimensions
at the same time can be perhaps identified in the attention recently devoted to the role
of complementarities (Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Amir, 1996). This toolkit
has been used to investigate the presence of complementarities within R&D portfolios
in monopoly (Athey and Schmutzler, 1995; Lambertini and Orsini, 2000; Lambertini,
2003, 2004; Lin, 2004; Mantovani, 2005) or oligopoly (Bonanno and Haworth, 1998; Lin
and Saggi, 2002; Rosenkranz, 2003). The bottom line of this stream of research is that
R&D eﬀorts in each direction boosts the firms’ incentive to carry out analogous eﬀort
in the other direction. Others have stressed the diﬀerence between innovations and im-
provements, i.e., between technological breakthroughs and engineering refinements (see
Doraszelski, 2004).2
However, notwithstanding the fact that R&D is an inherently dynamic feature of a
firm’s activities, most of the aforementioned contributions are in fact of a static nature.
Accordingly, it would be desirable to characterise the interplay between process and prod-
uct innovation in a properly dynamic setup. To this aim, we model the optimal behaviour
of a multiproduct monopolist investing both in process and in product innovation. By
process innovation we mean that the firm invests in order to reduce the marginal produc-
1Two relevant examples are the contributions of Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (1987).
2A related literature describes the dynamics of product and process innovation in connection with
technology life cycle. The common view emerging from this strand is that product innovation necessarily
precedes process innovation. See Abernathy and Utterback (1975, 1982), Klepper (1996) and Adner and
Levinthal (2001).
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tion cost which is assumed to be the same for all varieties, while by product innovation
we mean that the firm wants to increase the degree of diﬀerentiation between any two
varieties. This problem is built up as an optimal control model where the marginal cost
and the degree of diﬀerentiation (or substitutability) are state variables, with the firm
controlling output and R&D levels at any time over an infinite horizon.
The main results of our analysis can be outlined as follows. We identify the conditions
ensuring the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point.
The economic features of the model, describing the qualitative properties of the optimal
behaviour of the firm, are as follows. First, R&D eﬀorts intensify in both directions as
the number of varieties increases. This is intuitively due to a cannibalization eﬀect taking
place among product varieties as the product space become more and more crowded.
In order to safeguard its profitability, the monopolist has to invest higher amounts of
resources to lower both variable production costs and substitutability. The second result
has to do with the relative intensity of R&D eﬀorts. To this regard, we prove that, if the
reservation price is suﬃciently low, the firm finds it convenient to devote a larger amount
of resources to process rather than product innovation irrespectively of the extent of the
product range and the associated level of diﬀerentiation. This is driven by the fact that
the interval between the reservation price and marginal cost is too narrow. If instead the
reservation price is high enough, then the relative intensity of R&D eﬀorts is determined
by the interaction between the number of varieties and the degree of diﬀerentiation, i.e.,
the cannibalization problem. If diﬀerentiation is low, then product R&D draws a larger
amount of resources than process R&D. Conversely, if diﬀerentiation is high, the allocation
of resources over the R&D portfolio also depends upon the number of varieties, so that
the firm may indeed invest more in process rather than in product innovation. The third
result holds irrespective of the demand level and the extension of the product range: we
show that there always exists complementarity within the R&D portfolio, i.e., decreasing
marginal production cost prompts for an analogous reduction of product substitutability,
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and conversely. This is true both along the optimal paths to the steady state and in
steady state.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the basics of the model.
the equilibrium analysis is in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We build an optimal control problem over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) , where at any instant
a multiproduct monopolist chooses the quantity level for each of N product varieties and
the investment level in product and process innovation. Process innovation is formalized
as a reduction of the unit cost of production, while product innovation aﬀects product
substitutability as perceived by consumers.
As in Spence (1976) and Singh and Vives (1984), the representative consumer’s in-
stantaneous utility function is defined in terms of the consumption of N diﬀerentiated
goods and the numeraire good m > 0, and is given by:
u(q(t),m) = a
NX
i=1
qi(t)−
1
2
Ã
NX
i=1
[qi (t)]
2 + s (t)
NX
i=1
X
j 6=i
qi (t) qj (t)
!
+m, (1)
where q(t) ≡ (q1 (t) , q2 (t) ...qN (t)) is the vector of quantities consumed at any instant
t, a is a positive parameter and s(t) ∈ [0, 1] . The state variable s(t) represents the
degree of substitutability between any two products. If s(t) = 1, products are completely
homogeneous. If instead s(t) = 0, products are independent and variety i’s price is
unaﬀected by the supply of any other variety. Constrained utility maximization for any
given price vector p (t) ≡ (p1 (t) , p2 (t) ...pN (t)) gives rise to the following demand system:
pi(t) = a− qi(t)− s(t)
X
j 6=i
qj(t) ∀i 6= j (2)
where at any time t, the production of output level qi(t) involves a linear cost function,
so that the instantaneous cost function of the monopolist is C (q (t)) = c (t)
PN
i=1 qi (t),
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where c (t) is the unit cost of production common to all varieties.
We assume that product diﬀerentiation can be aﬀected by R&D investment in product
innovation. The dynamics associated to product innovation is described by the kinematic
equation:
ds(t)
dt
≡ ·s = s(t) [−x(t) + δ] (3)
where x(t) represents the eﬀort made by the firm at time t in order to increase product
diﬀerentiation through a reduction of s(t).3 Parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the depreciation
rate due to ageing of technology. Equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
·
s
s(t)
= −x(t) + δ (4)
so as to highlight that the rate of change of product substitutability over time is linear in
the instantaneous investment eﬀorts.
Moreover, the firm invests in process innovation; as a consequence, unit cost c (t)
evolves over time as described by the following:
dc(t)
dt
≡ ·c = c(t) [−k(t) + η] (5)
where k(t) is the R&D eﬀort for process innovation. Parameter η ∈ [0, 1] is the depre-
ciation rate. The rate of change of unit cost over time is linear in the instantaneous
investment eﬀort, given that:
·
c
c(t)
= −k(t) + η. (6)
Equation (5) is indeed a dynamic version of the linear R&D technology employed by
Lambertini (2003, 2004) and Lin (2004).
The instantaneous cost of investing in product innovation and in process innovation
is respectively given by C (x (t)) = γ [x(t)]2 and C (k (t)) = β [k(t)]2, where γ and β are
3The idea that s depends upon firms’ investment decisions has been investigated in static models by
Harrington (1995), Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (1998). Recent
contributions apply this idea to diﬀerential games, e.g. Cellini and Lambertini (2002 and 2004).
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positive parameters. Hence, investing in both types of R&D implies decreasing returns
to innovative activity.
Gross profits from sales are ψi (t) =
h
a− qi(t)− s(t)
P
j 6=i qj(t)− c (t)
i
qi(t) for each
variety i = 1, 2, ...N. Instantaneous profits are given by:
π(t) =
NX
i=1
"
a− qi(t)− s(t)
X
j 6=i
qj(t)− c (t)
#
qi(t)− γ [x(t)]2 − β [k(t)]2 (7)
The monopolist aims at maximizing the discounted profit flow:
Π(t) =
Z ∞
0
π(t) e−ρtdt (8)
w.r.t. R&D eﬀorts x(t), k(t) and the vector of market variables q(t), under the constraint
given by the state dynamics (3) and (5). Therefore the problem features N + 2 controls
and two states. The discount rate ρ > 0 is assumed to be constant. The solution of the
monopolist’s maximization problem is illustrated in the next section.
3 Optimal Process and Product Innovation
Using the state dynamics (3) and (5) and the expression of the instantaneous profits (7),
we may write the current value Hamiltonian function of the firm as follows:
H(t) = e−ρt
h
π(t) + λs(t)
·
s+ λc(t)
·
c
i
(9)
where λs(t) = µs(t)e
ρt, λc(t) = µc(t)e
ρt, µs (t) and µc(t) being the co-state variables
associated to s(t) and c(t), respectively. The first order conditions (FOCs) on controls
are:4
∂H(t)
∂qi(t)
= a− c (t)− 2
Ã
qi (t) + s (t)
X
j 6=i
qj (t)
!
= 0⇒ q∗i (t) =
a− c (t)− 2s(t)
P
j 6=i qj(t)
2
(10)
4For the sake of brevity, in the remainder we omit the indication of exponential discounting. Moreover,
second order conditions are also omitted throughout the paper. They are always met, as it can be verified
using diﬀerent methods (see Mangasarian, 1966; Arrow, 1968; Stalford and Leitmann, 1973).
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∂H(t)
∂x(t)
= −2γx(t)− λs(t)s(t) = 0⇒ x∗(t) = −
λs(t)s(t)
2γ
(11)
∂H(t)
∂k(t)
= −2βk(t)− λc(t)c(t) = 0⇒ k∗(t) = −
λc(t)c(t)
2β
(12)
The corresponding co-state equations are:
−∂H(t)
∂s(t)
=
·
λs − ρλs(t)⇒
·
λs =
NX
i=1
qi(t)
X
j 6=i
qj(t)− λs(t) [δ − ρ− x(t)] (13)
−∂H(t)
∂c(t)
=
·
λc − ρλc(t)⇔
·
λc =
NX
i=1
qi(t)− λc(t) [η − ρ− k (t)] (14)
along with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µs (t) s (t) = 0; limt→∞
µc (t) c (t) = 0. (15)
Now, from (11) we have:
λs(t) = −
2γx(t)
s(t)
(16)
as well as the expression of the optimal x(t), which can be diﬀerentiated w.r.t. t:
·
x = − 1
2γ
∙ ·
λs (t) + λ(t)
·
s
¸
. (17)
Following an analogous procedure with (12), we obtain:
λc(t) = −
2βk(t)
c(t)
(18)
and
·
k = − 1
2β
∙ ·
λcc(t) + λc(t)
·
c
¸
. (19)
For intuitive reasons, without loss of generality we can impose symmetry on output levels,
so that qi (t) = q (t) for all i = 1, 2, ...N. Then, using (3) and (5), together with (13-14)
as well as (16) and (18), we can rewrite (17) and (19) as follows:
·
x = ρx− N (N − 1) [q(t)]
2 s (t)
2γ
(20)
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·
k = ρk − Nq (t) c (t)
2β
. (21)
The next step consists in solving (10) w.r.t. q (t) :
q∗ (t) =
a− c (t)
2 [1 + s (t) (N − 1)] (22)
which can be substituted into (20-21):
·
x = ρx− N (N − 1) [a− c (t)]
2 s (t)
8γ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]2
(23)
·
k = ρk − N [a− c (t)] c (t)
4β [1 + s (t) (N − 1)] . (24)
On the basis of the above diﬀerential equations describing the rates of change of R&D
controls, we find a relevant property:
Proposition 1 The paths of R&D investments are characterised by strategic complemen-
tarity at any point in time.
Proof. Examine the following partial derivatives:
∂
·
x
∂c (t)
=
N (N − 1) [a− c (t)] s (t)
32
©
γ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]2
ª2 > 0
∂
·
k
∂s (t)
=
N (N − 1) [a− c (t)] c (t)
4β [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]2
> 0
(25)
These suﬃce to prove that any decrease in marginal cost (resp. product substitutability)
triggers an increase in the instantaneous rate of change of the R&D activity for product
(resp., process) innovation. This proves the claim.
With reference to the result stated in Proposition 1, which reveals the existence of
dynamic strategic complementarity between R&D activities, one may wonder whether
this property characterises the equilibrium eﬀorts as well. This is going to be verified
below.
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Now, imposing the stationarity conditions
·
x = 0 and
·
k = 0, we find the optimal
investment levels in terms of states, the number of products and the parameters of the
model:
x∗ =
N (N − 1) [a− c (t)]2 s (t)
8γρ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]2
; k∗ =
N [a− c (t)] c (t)
4βρ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)] . (26)
A natural question that springs to mind is whether the firm has a higher incentive to
invest in process or product R&D, and under what circumstances either eﬀort is larger
than the other. To this regard, we can prove:
Proposition 2 Consider optimal investments x∗ and k∗. The following holds:
• suppose a ∈
µ
c,
(β + 2γ)
β
c
¸
. If so, then k∗ > x∗ always;
• now suppose instead a > (β + 2γ)
β
c. In such a case, then: (i) if s ∈ [0, 1/2) ,
then k∗ > x∗ for all N ∈
∙
1,
2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c)
[β (a− c) + 2γc] s
¶
; and k∗ < x∗ for all N >
2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c)
[β (a− c) + 2γc] s ; (ii) if s ∈ [1/2, 1] , then k
∗ < x∗ for all N ≥ 1.
Proof. From (26), we have
x∗ > k∗ ⇔ N [β (a− c) + 2γc] s > 2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c) . (27)
Note that the r.h.s. is always positive, while the l.h.s. may take either sign. If a <
(β + 2γ) c/β, which is an admissible case as (β + 2γ) /β > 1, then surely x∗ < k∗. Oth-
erwise, the sign of x∗ − k∗ depends upon the value of N and s. In particular, provided
a > (β + 2γ) c/β, we have x∗ > k∗ if
N >
2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c)
[β (a− c) + 2γc] s , (28)
with
2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c)
[β (a− c) + 2γc] s > 1∀ s ∈ [0, 1/2) . (29)
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Therefore, if s ∈ [1/2, 1] ,
2γc (1− s) + βs (a− c)
[β (a− c) + 2γc] s < 1 (30)
and, as a consequence, k∗ < x∗ for all N ≥ 1.
The above result can be given the following intuitive explanation. When the reserva-
tion price is comparatively low, then the monopolist finds it convenient to devote a larger
amount of resources to process rather than product innovation for any level of both N
and s, because the distance between the reservation price and marginal cost is too narrow.
Otherwise, if a is high enough, the relative intensity of R&D eﬀorts depends upon the
interplay between the extension of the product range and the degree of substitutability
between any two varieties. This interaction accounts for a crowding eﬀect in the prod-
uct space which is intimately connected to cannibalization. When s is large, the lack of
diﬀerentiation calls for a higher investment in this direction. When instead s is already
low enough, then the relative weight of process and product innovation in the firm’s R&D
portfolio is also determined by the number of varieties being supplied. If such a number
is larger than the critical threshold highlighted in the proposition, then cannibalization
drives the result that x∗ > k∗.
The expressions (26) can be used to carry out comparative statics on optimal R&D
eﬀorts. In particular, the following properties can be easily singled out:
∂x∗
∂s (t)
∝ − [s (t) (N − 1)− 1] , (31)
so that ∂x∗/∂s (t) > 0 iﬀ s (t) < 1/(N − 1) ≡ bs. Note that bs ∈ [0, 1] iﬀ N ≥ 2. Moreover,
∂bs/∂N < 0 always, with limN→∞ bs = 0. As to the investment in process innovation,
∂k∗/∂s (t) < 0 always. Therefore, we may claim:
Proposition 3 The interval wherein ∂x∗/∂s (t) > 0 is monotonically decreasing in the
number of product varieties. The incentive to carry out process innovation increases mono-
tonically in the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
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What the Proposition says is that the R&D eﬀort for product innovation is increasing
in the level of product substitutability if the latter is below a threshold value which, in
turn, is negatively correlated with the number of varieties. The intuition can be found in
the balance between three factors. The first is that, all else equal, if s (t) is large, then
the firm has a clear-cut incentive to reduce it by increasing x∗. The second is that the
R&D eﬀort involves a cost which is quadratic in the eﬀort itself. The third factor has to
do with internal fund raising to finance R&D, i.e., the fact that innovation expenditure is
paid for by using gross profits obtained from sales, which are decreasing in the degree of
substitutability.5 The first factor clearly exerts a positive eﬀect on x∗, while the opposite
holds for the second and the third one. If the cost and sales eﬀects overcome the pure
incentive to invest in product diﬀerentiation, then, overall, x∗ slopes downward as s (t)
becomes larger. The second claim in Proposition 3 reveals that there exists complemen-
tarity between process and product innovation. An intuitive reason is that any increase
in product diﬀerentiation involves larger internal funding to be used to finance also R&D
in the other direction.
Now we turn to examine the eﬀect of a change in marginal production cost on the
R&D incentives measured by (26). First, note that ∂k∗/∂c (t) ∝ a − 2c (t) > 0 for all
c (t) ∈ [0, a/2) . Then, ∂x∗/∂c (t) ∝ − [a− c (t)] < 0 always. These partial derivatives
yield:
Proposition 4 The R&D eﬀort for process innovation is concave and single-peaked w.r.t.
marginal production cost. The incentive to carry out product innovation decreases mono-
tonically in the level of the marginal production cost.
5Indeed, sales profits for each variety are given by the expression
ψi (q
∗) =
[a− c (t)]2
4 [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]
which is clearly decreasing in s (t) .
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Obviously, the second part of the above Proposition confirms the presence of comple-
mentarity between the two R&D activities. This result is qualitatively close to previous
research carried out in static models of product and process innovation (Lin and Saggi,
2002; Lambertini 2003, inter alia), although, in the present case, complementarity between
the two activities is the outcome of dynamic optimization rather than the backward induc-
tion method typically employed in multistage static games. In other words, the presence
of complementarity at equilibrium, highlighted in Proposition 3-4, is nothing but the
natural outcome of the dynamic complementarity illustrated in Proposition 1.
The next step consists in analysing what happens to optimal investments as a result
of a change in the extent of the product range:
∂x∗
∂N
= − [a− c (t)]
2 [1− s (t)−N (2− s (t))] s (t)
8γρ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]3
> 0;
∂k∗
∂N
=
[a− c (t)] c (t) [1− s (t)]
4βρ [1 + s (t) (N − 1)]2
> 0.
(32)
Both features can be explained on the basis of the cannibalization eﬀect obtaining as
N increases, whereby introducing any additional product variety generates a negative
externality on the existing ones, whose profitability declines as a result of a congestion of
the product space.6 Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 5 Any expansion of the product range calls for more intense R&D eﬀorts
in both directions.
Using (26) and imposing stationarity in turn on state equations, we find the following
expressions for the state variables:
s∗ (c) =
N (a− c)2 − 16δγρ− (a− c)
q
N
£
N (a− c)2 − 32δγρ
¤
16δγρ (N − 1) (33)
6Also N could be endogenously determined as a state variable requiring its own investment. For a
(static) model where the monopolist invests to increase the number of varieties while taking as given the
degree of substitutability, see Lambertini (2003, 2004) and Lin (2004).
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c∗ (s) =
aN −
p
N [a2N − 16βηρ (1 + s (N − 1))]
2N
(34)
Provided that s∗ (c) and c∗ (s) belong to R, then also s∗ (c) ∈ [0, 1] and c∗ (s) ∈ [0, a] .
However, note that
s∗ (c) ∈ R iﬀ ρ < N (a− c)
2
32δγ
(35)
c∗ (s) ∈ R iﬀ ρ < a
2N
16βη (1 + s (N − 1)) (36)
Therefore:
Lemma 6 If
ρ ∈
"
0,min
(
N (a− c)2
32δγ
,
a2N
16βη (1 + s (N − 1))
)!
then there exists an internal solutions along both dimensions of the monopolist’s R&D
activity.
Finally, we come to the evaluation of the stability properties of the model. Given that
the Jacobian matrix is 4× 4, one cannot draw the phase diagram. The Jacobian matrix
is:
J∗ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂
·
s
∂s
= δ − x ∂
·
s
∂x
− s ∂
·
s
∂c
= 0
∂
·
s
∂k
= 0
∂
·
x
∂s
=
(a− c)2N (N − 1) [s (N − 1)− 1]
8γ [1 + s (N − 1)]3
∂
·
x
∂x
= ρ
∂
·
x
∂c
=
(a− c)N (N − 1) s
4γ [1 + s (N − 1)]2
∂
·
x
∂k
= 0
∂
·
c
∂s
= 0
∂
·
c
∂x
= 0
∂
·
c
∂c
= η − k ∂
·
c
∂k
= −c
∂
·
k
∂s
=
c (a− c)N (N − 1)
4β [1 + s (N − 1)]2
∂
·
k
∂x
= 0
∂
·
k
∂c
= − (a− 2c)N
4β [1 + s (N − 1)]
∂
·
k
∂k
= ρ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(37)
whose characteristic equations yields four eigenvalues. Unfortunately, assessing the sign
of such eigenvalues analytically is not feasible as their expressions are cumbersome. More-
over, we cannot obtain the explicit solutions for c∗ and s∗ as a function of parameters
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only, as the system
c− c∗ (s) = 0
s− s∗ (c) = 0
(38)
is made up by equations whose degree is higher than four.
However, we may resort to numerical calculations, which can be performed as follows.
We use the solutions:
x∗ = δ ; k∗ = η (39)
and set the numerical values of parameters:
a = 1;β = γ =
1
2
; δ = η = ρ =
1
20
;N = 3. (40)
Then, we may (i) solve the system (38) numerically, and (ii) compute the eigenvalues
{ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4} of J∗. Given (40), we have:
c∗ ' 0.00167 ; s∗ ' 0.00168 (41)
ζ1 ' −0.0309 ; ζ2 ' 0.0809 (42)
ζ3 ' −0.0307 ; ζ4 ' 0.0807.
Using instead:
a = 2;β = γ =
1
2
; δ =
1
20
; η =
1
30
; ρ =
1
40
;N = 5, (43)
we obtain:
c∗ ' 0.00017 ; s∗ ' 0.00006 (44)
ζ1 ' −0.0251 ; ζ2 ' 0.0503 (45)
ζ3 ' −0.0188 ; ζ4 ' 0.0440.
In general, repeating the same exercise for admissible parameter values, one can verify
that the outcome is regularly ζ1, ζ3 < 0 while ζ2, ζ4 > 0. Therefore, the equilibrium is a
saddle point. Accordingly, we may state our main result as follows:
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Proposition 7 The steady state equilibrium identified by {c∗ (s) , s∗ (c) , x∗ = δ, k∗ = η}
is a saddlepoint.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered an optimal control model to study the dynamic behaviour
of a multiproduct monopolist investing both in process innovation to reduce the marginal
production cost and in product innovation to increase the degree of diﬀerentiation between
any two varieties.
We have identified the conditions ensuring the existence of a unique steady state equi-
librium, which is a saddle point. As for the economic features of the model, we have
highlighted three results. First, we have found that firms face a higher incentive to invest
both in process and in product innovation as the number of varieties increases. This is
intuitively due to a cannibalization eﬀect taking place among product varieties as the
product space becomes progressively more crowded. Second, we have studied the com-
position on R&D portfolio to understand which activity draws more resources. We have
showed that, if the reservation price is suﬃciently low, the firm finds it convenient to
devote a larger amount of resources to process rather than product innovation irrespec-
tively of the extent of the product range and the associated level of diﬀerentiation. If
instead the reservation price is high enough, then the relative intensity of R&D eﬀorts is
determined by the interaction between the number of varieties and the degree of diﬀeren-
tiation, reflecting thus the cannibalization problem. Third, irrespectively of the demand
level and the extension of the product range, we have proven that there always exists
complementarity within the R&D portfolio, i.e., any decrease in marginal production cost
prompts for an analogous reduction of product substitutability, and conversely. This is
true both along the optimal paths to the steady state and in steady state.
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